

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 173363

NODIS

LONDON FOR JOSEPH S. NYE

FOL RPT TEHRAN 6512 ACTION SECSTATE 9 JUL 78 QUOTE

S E C R E T TEHRAN 6512

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM NEWSOM

EO 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PEPR, MASS, IR

SUBJ: AUDIENCE WITH THE SHAH

1. FOLLOWING ARE HIGH LIGHTS OF ONE HOUR, 45 MINUTE AUDIENCE
WITH SHAH JULY 9. (SEPARATE TELEGRAMS WILL PROVIDE DETAILS
PRINCIPAL POINTS.)

2. AT OUTSET I TOLD SHAH THAT I WAS VISITING AREA AT REQUEST
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PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY TO ASSESS CURRENT SITUATION AND WAS,
IN VIEW IMPORTANCE OUR RELATIONSHIP, INTENTIONALLY STARTING
WITH TEHRAN TO SEEK HIS VIEWS AND ADVICE ON RECENT DEVELOP-
MENTS. IN TURN SHAH GAVE, IN UNEMOTIONAL TONES, HIS TRADI-
TIONAL VIEW OF SOVIET PLAN TO THRUST TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA,
RED SEA AND PERSIAN GULF. HE MENTIONED RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN AFRICA, ADEN AND AFGHANISTAN AS PART OF THIS PROCESS.

3. IN RESPONSE I TOLD HIM THAT WE TOO WERE CONCERNED ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS WHICH SEEMED TO REPRESENT SOVIET ADVANCES, THAT THE USSR REMAINED OUR PRINCIPAL POTENTIAL ADVERSARY, AND THAT WE WERE AS INTERESTED AS EVER IN COUNSELING WITH OUR FRIENDS ABOUT HOW TO RESTRAIN ADVANCES OF SOVIET INFLUENCE. WE MAY SEE SOVIETS AS REACTING MORE TO OPPORTUNITIES THAN AS FOLLOWING A GRAND DESIGN BUT WE WERE EQUALLY CONCERNED WITH RESULTS. I ASSURED HIM THAT FEARS HE HAD EXPRESSED TO OTHERS THAT U.S. PULLING BACK OR CONNIVING WITH SOVIETS TO ESTABLISH SPHERES OF INFLUENCE WERE GROUNDLESS. I THEN ASKED SHAH HOW HE FELT U.S. AND FRIENDS OF U.S. SHOULD DEAL WITH ADVANCES IN AREAS HE HAD MENTIONED.

4. TO SHAH, PAKISTAN WAS OBVIOUSLY KEY IN DEALING WITH AFGHANISTAN SITUATION. HE CONTINUED TO ADVOCATE CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAN, PAKISTAN AND INDIA, BUT THIS APPROACH WAS OBVIOUSLY MADE DIFFICULT BY CONTINUING PAKISTANI EMOTIONS TOWARD INDIA.

5. SHAH SAID HE WOULD CONTINUE TO ASSIST PAKISTAN AND WOULD BE PREPARED HELP PAKISTAN ACQUIRE FRENCH MILITARY EQUIPMENT IF FRENCH CANCELED REPROCESSING PROJECT AS HE STRONGLY ADVISES THEM TO DO. HE ASSUMED U.S. WILL ALSO PROVIDE EQUIPMENT AND I OUTLINED OUR PLANS FOR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN.

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6. SHAH REACTED FAVORABLY TO OUR DECISION TO GO FORWARD WITH REVIEW OF HIS NOVEMBER MILITARY REQUIREMENTS LIST AND TO PROVIDE WEAPONS SUITES FOR FRIGATES BUT WAS OBVIOUSLY DISAPPOINTED THAT I COULD NOT HAVE COMMITMENT ON WILD WEASEL. HE UNDERSTOOD CEILING PROBLEM BUT WANTED TO BE SURE WE UNDERSTOOD THIS WOULD REQUIRE HIM TO PROCURE ITEMS ELSEWHERE. (MORE DETAILED TELEGRAM WILL FOLLOW.)

7. ON OTHER SUBJECTS SHAH MADE THESE POINTS:

A. TURKEY HAD SERIOUS INTERNAL PROBLEMS BUT HOPEFULLY THESE COULD BE OVERCOME. HE ARDENTLY WISHED U.S. EMBARGO COULD BE LIFTED.

B. ON INTERNAL AFGHANISTAN AFFAIRS HE SAW NO CLEAR OPPOSITION, AGREED THAT IRAN AND FRINDLY COUNTRIES SHOULD MAINTAIN RELATIONS WITH PRESENT REGIME, AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE DID NOT FULLY KNOW WHAT WAS GOIN ON.

C. ON BHUTTO HE SAID HE WAS OPPOSED TO EXECUTION BECAUSE OF WHAT IT WOULD DO TO INTERNAL FABRIC OF PAKISTAN WHICH WAS FRAGILE NOW. HE DID NOT SUGGEST TO ME AID TO PAKISTAN CONTINGENT ON COMMUTATION BHUTTO SENTENCE.

D. ON LIBERALIZATION IN IRAN HE ASSUED ME OF HIS INTENTION

TO CONTINUE, EVEN THOUGH HE FELT THERE WERE PROBLEMS AND RISKS. I ASSURED HIM WE WELCOMED THIS POLICY.

E. U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: HE UNDERSTOOD NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION BUT HE HOPED THEY WOULD NOT RESULT IN WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS FROM EUROPE. I ASSURED HIM THERE WAS NO PRESENT INTENTION IN THIS DIRECTION.

F. ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM: HE STRONGLY SUPPORTED SADAT AND FELT THE ISRAELIS WERE "ACTING LIKE CHILDREN" IN A MANNER WHICH WAS NOT IN THEIR OWN INTERESTS. HE DOUBTED THAT BEGIN WAS A MAN TO BUILD PEACE. HE STRONGLY SUPPORTED OUR CONTINUING PEACE EFFORTS AS MEANS OF KEEPING RUSSIA OUT OF PROCESS. I BRIEFED HIM GENERALLY ON CURRENT STATE OF PEACE PROCESS.

G. RHODESIA: HE WAS OBVIOUSLY FOLLOWED RHODESIA SITUATION
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CLOSELY AND UNDERSTANDS IMPORTANCE OF WINNING NKOMO TO INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. (NKOMO WAS IN TEHRAN RECENTLY, ACCORDING TO SHAH, ASKING FOR MONEY. HE SAID HE WOULD PROVIDE NONE UNLESS NKOMO JOINED INTERNAL SETTLEMENT.)

H. IRAQ-IRAN: HE EXPRESSED FAMILIAR CONCERN WITH BAAHIST IDEOLOGY BUT INDICATED GENERAL SATISFACTION WITH STATE RELATIONS AND IRAQI STEPS AGAINST LOCAL COMMUNISTS. SAID HE HAD SEALED BORDER TO KEEP JALABANI FROM OPERATING IN IRAN-TURKEY-IRAQ TRIANGLE.

8. COMMENT: AT CONCLUSION SHAH EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR REASSURANCES AND SEEMED GENUINELY PLEASED WITH THEM. HE SAID HE WELCOMED PERIODIC REVIEWS OF THIS TYPE. (PROTOCOL OFFICER TOLD ME THIS WAS LONGEST AUDIENCE BY VISITOR WITH SHAH HE COULD REMEMBER IN TWELVE YEARS EXCEPT FOR ONE WITH KOSYGIN.) MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO HIM OF U.S. CONTINUING TO REMAIN INVOLVED AND TO SHOULDER RESPONSIBILITIES OF MAJOR POWER IS OBVIOUS.

9. I FOUND HIM MORE RELAXED THAN I HAD ANTICIPATED AND MORE REALISTIC ABOUT LIMITATIONS OF POSSIBLE ACTION THAN I HAD EXPECTED. DESPITE HIS EXPRESSION OF CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET ADVANCES, HIS ACTUAL CAUTIONS AND APPROACHES ARE VERY CLOSE TO OURS. HIS MAJOR DISAPPOINTMENT WAS ON FACT WE COULD NOT AGREE NOW TO WILD WEASEL.

10. I HAVE PROMISED TO ADVISE HIM THROUGH EMBASSY TEHRAN OF RESULTS MY REMAINING STOPS.
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UNQUOTE VANCE

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